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Friday, 1 November 2013

Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Vol. IIA

Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Vol. IIA

Operation Barbarossa: Volume IIA concerns the Wehrmacht. All the significant German weapon systems and combat squads used in the campaign are analysed using the quantitative methodology detailed in Volume I, along with the contextual history.

An assessment of each weapon system's inherent 'combat power' is provided, as well as attributes such as the relative anti-tank, anti-personnel and anti-aircraft values. Volume Iia then focuses on the detailed Kriegstarkenachweisungen (KstN, or Toe) for German land units (including those in the West), as well as the unit's actual organisation and equipment.

All significant units in the German Army (Heer), Waffen Ss, Luftwaffe and security forces are included; ranging from the largest panzer divisions, down to small anti-aircraft companies, military-police units, Landesschutzen battalions, and rail-road and construction companies.

In all cases the data is presented in detailed tables, using the weapon systems and combat squads previously analysed.

Sunday, 20 October 2013

The Siege of Eshowe

The Siege of Eshowe

22 January 1879 3 April 1879 Eshowe was a mission station, abandoned some months before, but now selected for an entrenched post, in preference to more open and commanding ground to the north, in consequence of the necessity of utilising the buildings for the storage of supplies. The station consisted of a dwelling house, school, and workshop, with store rooms three buildings of sun dried brick, thatched there was also a small church, made of the same materials, but with a corrugated iron roof and a stream of good water ran close by the station. Here the column encamped, and preparations for clearing the ground and establishing a fortified post for a garrison of 400 men were made. 

Two companies of Buffs, two companies Native Contingent, and some mounted men, were sent back to reinforce Lieutenant Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, was on the march to Eshowe with a convoy of sixty wagons. 

On the 25th, Major Coates was sent down to the Tugela with a strong escort and forty eight empty wagons, for a further supply of stores and next day a runner arrived with news that a disaster had occurred on the 22nd. On the 28th a telegram was received from Lord Chelmsford, hinting at disaster that he had been compelled to retire to the frontier that former instructions were cancelled, and Colonel Pearson was to hold Eshowe or withdraw to the Tugela, also that he must be prepared to bear the brunt of an attack from the whole Zulu army. 

Colonel Pearson at once assembled his staff and commanding officers, when it was finally decided to hold the post, sending back to the Tugela the mounted troops and Native Contingent. These marched, unencumbered with baggage, and reached the Tugela in ten hours a contrast with the upward march. The various buildings were loopholed, and the church prepared for use as a hospital, all tents struck, and the entrenchments supplemented by an inner line of wagons, In the evening Colonel Elys convoy arrived safely. 

The mounted men were sent back from Eshowe, because a large proportion of the horse forage consisted of mealies, which it was thought might be required for the use of the garrison, as eventually was the case. To replace the mounted men, a small vedette corps was formed under Lieutenant Rowden, 99th Regiment, and Captain Sherrington, of the Native Contingent, and did excellent service. 

These vedettes were constantly under fire. One was killed at his post. Another was attacked by some dozen Zulus, who crept upon him through the long grass he lost two fingers of his right hand, had a bullet through each leg and one in his right arm; his horse was assegaied yet he managed to get back to the fort, retaining his rifle. 

The vedettes being much annoyed in the early morning by the fire of some Zulus from a high hill, Captain Sherrington and six of the men went out one night and lay in wait for them, behind some rocks near the top of the hill, wounding three and putting an end to the annoyance. 

Colonel Pearson felt it to be necessary to reduce the bread and grocery rations of the troops, but was enabled to increase the meat ration by a quarter of a pound, as a large number of cattle had been brought up with Colonel Elys convoy. The wagons of the troops sent back to the Tugela were officially searched, and a quantity of food, medicines, and medical comforts thus added to the stock, the two latter subsequently proving of the utmost value. All articles of luxury were eventually sold by auction, and fetched almost fabulous prices matches were sold for 4s. a box, bottles of pickles 15s. each, and tobacco 30s. a pound.

The water supply was excellent, both in quality and quantity and in the lower part of the stream bathing places for both officers and men were constructed and all sanitary arrangements most carefully attended to. A wagon laager was formed for the cattle, and every effort made to provide for the security of the fort, as we may now call it deepening ditches, strengthening parapets, erecting stockades all most energetically carried on under the direction of Captain Wynne, Royal Engineers

So things went on, till, on February 9th, Zulus were observed to be collecting but nothing occurred beyond an occasional alarm. 

On the 11th two runners arrived from the Lower Tugela with a despatch from the General, almost requiring Colonel Pearson to retire with half his force to the Tugela, leaving the remainder to garrison the fort. This, after a council of war, was decided not to be practicable, the country being occupied by the Zulus in force. A flying column, however, was organised, in case it became necessary to carry out what the General seemed to desire. 

Having questioned the messengers, and ascertained that they were willing to return on the following Saturday, Colonel Pearson sent a despatch, asking for further instructions, and saying he would be prepared to start on Sunday night at twelve o'clock if necessary. This message was twice repeated on different days, but no reply received. 

Alterations and improvements in the defences, to enable the fort to be held by a smaller garrison, went steadily on in spite of bad weather ranges from 600 to 700 yards were marked round the fort, and trous-de-loups and wire entanglements formed on the north, south, and east faces. 

On 1st March an expedition was led out by Colonel Pearson to attack a military kraal (Dabulamanzfs) six miles distant this was done and the kraal burnt, a smart skirmish being kept up with the Zulus during the homeward march. 

On the 2nd it was noticed that heliograph signals were being flashed from the Lower Tugela, but no message was made out. 

Next day further signalling, though vague, was taken to mean that a convoy was to be expected on the 13th instant with 1000 men, and that on its approach Colonel Pearson was to sally out and meet it. A heliograph was improvised by Captain Macgregor, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, by means of a small looking glass, and efforts made to flash back signals, but bad weather ensued, preventing further communication till the 10th. 

A new road to Inyezane, shortening the distance by about three miles, and avoiding much of the bush, was commenced, and reported fit for use on the 13th, though the work had been hindered by very bad weather, and by the working parties being constantly under fire. Fortunately no one was hit, except Lieutenant Lewis, of The Buffs.

On 23rd March two Zulus came up with a white flag, and were brought in to the fort each with a mealie bag over his head they are said to have come with a message from the king to the effect that if our force would return to Natal he would order the officers commanding his large armies not to touch it. These men were detained as prisoners in irons, and interviewed by Lord Chelmsford on his arrival at Eshowe but of their subsequent disposal nothing appears known. 

At first the health of the troops was extremely good, but before the end of February the percentage of sick had largely increased, there being 9 officers and upwards of 100 men on the sick list when it was relieved. The principal disorders were diarrhoea, dysentery, and fevers, aggravated by the want of proper medicines and medical comforts, which had been soon exhausted. The church was used as the hospital, and both officers and men lived under the wagons, over which the wagon sails were spread, propped up with tent poles thus the troops actually lived at their alarm posts. 

The relief took place none too soon, there being then but six days further supply of reduced rations available for the garrison. From first to last, the men showed an excellent spirit, the highest discipline was maintained, and the reduction of the food was never grumbled at or regarded in any other light than a necessity and a privation to be borne, and which they were determined to bear cheerfully.

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief

Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford Relief Column for Eshowe

1st Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel F.T.A. Law
Naval Brigade Artillery from HMS Shah and HMS Tenedos
2 x 9 pounder guns and limbers
2 x 24 pounder rocket tubes 
1 x Gatling gun and limber
Naval Brigade's contingents from HMS Shah and HMS Tenedos
91st (Princess Louise's Argyllshire Highlanders) Regiment of Foot
2 x Companies 2nd/3rd East Kent (The Buffs) Regiment of Foot
5 x Companies 99th (Duke of Edinburgh's Lanarkshire) Regiment of Foot
4th Battalion, Natal Native Contingent

2nd Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W.L. Pemberton
Naval Brigade Artillery from HMS Boadicea
2 x 24 pounder rocket tubes 
2 x Gatling gun and limber
Naval Brigade Contingent from HMS Boadicea, detachments of Royal Marines from HMS Boadicea and HMS Shah
57th (West Middlesex) Regiment of Foot
6 x Companies 3rd/60th (The King's Royal Rifle Corps) Regiment of Foot
5th Battalion, Natal Native Contingent 

Divisional Troops, under the command of Major P.H.S. Barrow
Jantzi Native Horse 
Mafunzi's Mounted Natives 
No. 1 Troop Natal horse 
Natal Volunteer Guides 
Native Foot Scouts 

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Somopho kaZikhala 
Phalane kaMdinwa
Mbilwane kaMahlanganisa
Masegwane kaSopigwasi
Sigcwelecwele KaMhlekehleke
Prince Dabulamanzi kaMapande
Mavumengwana

uVe
umHlanga
uMbonambi
umCijo
inGobamakhosi
uNokhenke
uThulwana

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The Battle of Ulundi

The Battle of Ulundi

On the 4th July 1879 at 6.45 A.M., the force crossed the river, leaving the camp garrisoned by the 1st/24th Regiment, a company of Engineers, and casualties (about 900 Europeans, 250 natives, with one Gatling gun). 

Lieutenant Colonel Buller, with the light cavalry of the Flying Column, crossed in advance, and occupied the high ground in front without opposition the main body following, marched up the broken ground out of the valley, and formed a hollow square, the ammunition carts, etc., in the centre, and the guns in position ready to come into action without delay. The Flying Column formed the front half, and the 2nd Division the rear half of the square front, flanks, and rear covered by the cavalry. In this formation the troops advanced to the spot selected by Colonel Buller, which was about 700 yards beyond the Nodwengo kraal, and about the same distance from a stream that crossed the road halfway to Ulundi high ground, commanding the adjacent country, and with little cover beyond long grass, near it. 

The guns were posted,in the angles and in the centre of each face of the square, and each face had a company of infantry in reserve. 

Large numbers of Zulus were now seen coming from the hills on the left and left front, and other masses on the right, partly concealed by the mist from the river, passed the Nodwengo kraal to surround the square. 

The cavalry on the right and left became engaged at 8.45 A.M., and, slowly retiring as the enemy advanced, passed into the square, which immediately opened fire. 

The Zulu advance was made with great determination, but their movements appeared to be without order. Some individuals managed to reach within thirty or forty yards of the rear face, where there was some cover, but the main advance on all sides was checked at some distance by the heavy artillery fire and steady volleys of the infantry. These were so effective that within half an hour the enemy wavered and gave way, when the cavalry dashed out to complete their discomfiture. Passing out by the rear face of the square, Colonel Drury Lowe (who had been already wounded) led the 17th Lancers in the direction of the Nodwengo kraal, dispersing the enemy and killing those that could not reach the shelter of the kraal or the bush below then wheeling to the right, he charged through the enemy, who were endeavouring to reach the mountains beyond.

In this manner the whole of the level ground was cleared. Lieutenant Colonel Buller’s command also took up the pursuit, doing much execution until the enemy mounted the slopes of the hills and were beyond their reach. But even then a place of safety was not gained, for some guns were moved out from the square, and got the range of the enemy retreating over the hills. The brunt of this day’s work fell on the cavalry. Even in the pursuit the greater part of the Zulus turned and fought for their lives. Overtaken by a Lancer, a Zulu would stop just before the fatal thrust was delivered, and, dodging like lightning, evade the lance, sometimes seizing it and holding on till the Lancer was relieved by a comrade. 

The Irregular Horse, Mounted Infantry, and Native Horse (Captain T. Shcpstone’s Basutu and the Natal Native Horse under Captain Cochrane), thoroughly searched the ground, disposing of the enemy who had taken refuge in dongas, bush, and long grass. 600 Zulus are said to have fallen before the cavalry alone 15O of them being credited to the Lancers. 

Thus was fought the battle of Ulundi. It was impossible for the ill armed enemy to pass the belt of fire that encircled the square, even had they not been shaken by the accurate artillery fire whilst yet at a distance. 

The ease with which the attack was repelled may be gathered from the fact that the average number of rounds fired by the infantry actually in the ranks was less than six and a half rounds per man (6‘4 rounds). 

The troops certainly were very steady, and the firing generally volley firing by sections was as a rule under perfect command. 

We have heard of an officer calmly smoking his pipe whilst in command of his company during the engagement. 

As soon as the wounded had been attended to, the force advanced to the banks of the stream near Ulundi, whilst the cavalry swept the country beyond. Ulundi was fired at 11.40 A.M., and the adjacent kraals shortly afterwards. At 2 P.M., the return march to the camp commenced. Every military kraal in the valley that had not previously been destroyed was in flames and not a sign of the Zulu army was to be perceived. 

The British force engaged consisted of 4062 Europeans and 1103 natives, with 12 guns and 2 Gatlings. The loss killed, 2 officers (Captain Wyatt Edgell, 17th Lancers, and the Hon. W. Drummond, in charge of the Intelligence Department), 13 non-commissioned officers and men, and 3 natives wounded, 19 officers, 59 non-commissioned officers and men, and 7 natives. 

The Zulu force is estimated variously; some put it at 12,000, some at 20,000. Being scattered over a large extent of country, and some of the regiments engaged having already suffered heavily, it is not easy to arrive at a reliable conclusion. It is probable that the correct number lay between 15,000 and 20,000. 

As regards the Zulu loss, Lord Chelmsford says, It is impossible to estimate with any correctness the loss of the enemy, owing to the extent of country over which they attacked and retreated; but it could not have been less, I consider, than 1000 killed. (Despatch, 4th July). Using the same reasoning on the 6th, Lord Chelmsford says: But judging by the reports of those engaged, it cannot be placed at a less number than 1500 killed.

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief

Lieutenant Genral Lord Chelmsford

2nd Division South African Field Force Major General E. Newdigate
1st (The King's) Dragoon Guards
17th (Duke of Cambridge's Own) Lancers
N Battery, 6th Brigade, RA 6 x 9 pounder guns
N Battery, 5th Brigade, RA 2 x 7 pounder guns
2nd/21st Regiment of Foot (Royal Scotts Fusiliers)
58th (Rutlandshire) Regiment of Foot 
94th Regiment of Foot
Shepstone's Native Horse No. 3 Troop
Natal Horse (Bettington's Horse)
2nd Battalion Natal Native Contingent
Army Medical Department

Flying Column Brigdier General H.E. Wood
No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, RA 4 x 7 pounder guns
No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, RA 2 x Gatling guns
Detachment Royal Engineers
1st/13th Regiment of Foot (1st Somersetshire) Prince Albert's Light Infantry
80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) Regiment of Foot
90th (Perthshire Volunteers Light Infantry) Regiment of Foot
Mounted Infantry
Frontier Light Horse
Natal Light Horse
Natal Native Horse
Raaf's Transvaal Rangers
Wood's Irregulars
Natal Native Pioneer Corps
Detachment Army Hospital Corps

Garrison holding the camp at the White Mfolozi Colonel W. Bellairs 
1 x Company Royal Engineers
5 x Companies 1st/24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Prince Ziwedu KaMpande 
Ntshingwayo kaMahole 
Mnyamana kaNgqengelele 
Prince Dabulamanzi kaMapande 

inGobamakhosi
umCijo
uDloko
uDududu
umXhapho
amaKwenkwe
isAngqu
inSukamngeni 
uThulwana
iNgulube
inDlondlo
uMbonambi
uNokhenke
iNdluyengwe
uVe
iQwa

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The Battle of Rorke’s Drift

The Battle of Rorke’s Drift

The garrison of the Rorkes Drift post consisted of B Company 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment of Foot (Lieutenant Bromhead), and (with officers and casuals) was of a total strength of 139. It was encamped on the Natal side of the Buffalo, where there was a mission station, one building of which was used as a hospital and one as a commissariat store. The crossing of the river was effected by what are called ponts boats used as a kind of flying bridge and there were drifts, or fords, in the vicinity. Major Spalding, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, and Lieutenant Chard, Royal Engineers, were stationed here. The former rode off to Helpmakaar at 2 AM., 22nd January, to bring up Captain Rainforth’s company, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment of Foot, to protect the pont, leaving Lieutenant Chard in command of the post. 

About 3.15 A.M., Lieutenant Chard was at the ponts, when two men came riding from Zululand at a gallop, and shouted to be taken across the river. They were Lieutenant Adendorff, Natal Native Contingent, and a carbineer, who brought tidings of the disaster at Isandlwana and the advance of the Zulus towards Rorke’s Drift. Lieutenant Adendorff remained to assist in the defence of the post, and the carbineer rode on to take the news to Helpmakaar. 

Lieutenant Chard at once gave orders to secure the stores at the ponts, and rode up to the commissariat store, when he found a note had been received from the 3rd Column, saying the enemy were advancing, and directing them to strengthen and hold the post at all cost. Lieutenant Bromhead was actively at work preparing for defence, ably assisted by Mr. Dalton, of the Commissariat Department, loopholing the buildings and connecting them by walls of mealie bags and two wagons that were there. Lieutenant Chard then rode down to the pont, and brought up the guard and stores. 

An officer, with about a hundred of Durnford’s Horse, now arrived, and asked for orders. He was instructed to throw out men to watch the drifts and ponts, to check the enemy's advance, and fall back on the post when forced to retires These men had, however, been in the saddle since daylight, and had gone through a heavy engagement they were quite exhausted (besides being dispirited by the loss of their beloved leader), and after remaining a short time, retired to Helpmakaar. A detachment of Natal Native Contingent also left the post. 

Lieutenant Chard now commenced an inner work a retrenchment of biscuit boxes. This was two boxes high when, about 4.30 P.M., 500 or 600 of the enemy came in sight, and advanced at a run against the south wall. They were met with a well sustained fire, but, in spite of their loss, approached to within about fifty yards. 

Here they were checked by the cross fire from the attacked front and the store house. Some got under cover and kept up a heavy fire, but the greater number, without stopping, moved to the left, round the hospital, and made a rush at the wall of mealie bags. After a short but desperate struggle the enemy were driven back with heavy loss into the bush around the post. The main body of the enemy coming up, lined the ledge of rock, caves, etc., overlooking the work, at a distance of about 400 yards to the south, and from whence a constant fire was kept up, and they also occupied in great force the garden, hollow road, and bush. 

The bush not having been cleared away enabled the enemy to advance under cover close to the wall, and a series of desperate assaults were made, extending from the hospital along the wall as far as the bush reached each assault was brilliantly met and repulsed with the bayonet, Corporal Scheiss, Natal Native Contingent, . distinguishing himself greatly. The fire from the rocks took the work completely in reverse, and was so heavy that about 6 P.M. the garrison was obliged to retire behind the entrenchment of biscuit boxes. 

During this period the enemy had been storming the hospital, and at last succeeded in setting fire to the roof The garrison defended it most gallantly, bringing out all the sick that could be moved Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment of Foot, being the last men to leave, and holding the doorway with the bayonet when their ammunition was expended. The want of communication and the burning of the house rendered it impossible to save all the sick. 

It was now found necessary to make another entrenchment, which was done with two heaps of mealie bags, Assistant Commissary Dunne working hard at this, though much exposed. As darkness came on the little garrison was completely surrounded, but gallantly repulsed several serious assaults it was, however eventually forced to retire to the inner entrenchment, which it held throughout the night. The attack continued vigorously till midnight, the men firing on the assailants with the greatest coolness, aided by the light afforded by the burning hospital. A desultory fire was kept up by the enemy throughout the night, but this ceased about 4 A.M. on the 23rd, and at daybreak the enemy was out of sight. Lieutenant Chard at once set about patrolling round the post, collecting the Zulu arms, and strengthening the defences. 

About 7 A.M., a large body of the enemy appeared on the hills to the south-west, and Lieutenant Chard sent off a note to Helpmakaar asking for assistance. About 8 A.M., No. 3 Column appeared in sight, the enemy falling back on its approach. Thus ended a most gallant defence, reflecting the utmost credit on all concerned. The loss of the garrison was 15 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and 12 wounded of whom two died almost immediately. The attacking force was estimated at 3000 men, of whom upwards of 350 were killed. 

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief

No. 3 Column (detachment) Lt J.RM. Chard RE
B Company 2/24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot, Lt G. Bromhead
2nd/3rd East Kent (The Buffs) Regiment of Foot 
1/24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot
90th (Perthshire Volunteers Light Infantry) Regiment of Foot
Royal Artillery 
Royal Engineers
Commissariat Department 
Army Medical Department 
Chaplain's Department 
Natal native Police 
Natal Native Contingent 
Ferryman 

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Prince Dabulamanzi kaMapande

uThulwana 
uDloko
inDluyengwe
inDlondlo

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The Battle of Kambula

The Battle of Kambula

Warning of an intended attack on Kambula was brought in by a native one of Uhamo’s men about 11 A.M. on 29th March 1879, dense masses of the enemy were seen in the distance, when all the force was assembled and the cattle driven into their laager, At 1.30 P.M. the action commenced by mounted troops, under Colonels Buller and Russell, engaging the enemy on the north of the camp. They were speedily forced to return into the laager, followed by the Zulus until they were within 300 yards, when a heavy fire from the 90th Regiment checked their advance, and they opened out round the camp. 

At 2.15 the right front and rear of the camp were attacked by heavy masses of the enemy, who, apparently well supplied with Martini-Henry rifles, occupied a hill commanding the laager, enfilading it so that the company of the 13th posted at the right rear of the enclosure had to be withdrawn. The front of the cattle laager was, however, stoutly held by a company of the 13th; but the Zulus coming boldly on, Major Hackett, with two companies of the 90th, was directed to clear the slope. They sallied out into the open, driving the Zulus back in a gallant manner under a heavy fire, until ordered to retire by Colonel Wood. 

While bringing his men in, Major Hackett was dangerously wounded. 

The two guns in the redoubt were admirably worked by Lieutenant Nicholson, Royal Artillery, until he was mortally wounded when Major Vaughan, Royal Artillery, replaced him. Major Tremlett, Royal Artillery, with four guns, remained in the open during the engagement. 

The attack began to slacken about 5.30 P.M., enabling Colonel Wood to assume the offensive the Zulus were driven from the cattle kraal into which they penetrated, and from the immediate vicinity of the camp, the infantry doing great execution among the retreating masses. 

The pursuit was taken up by the mounted men under Colonel Buller, and continued for seven miles, killing great numbers, the enemy being too exhausted to fire in their own defence (Colonel Wood’s despatch of March 30th). All agreed in admiring the pluck of the Zulus, who, under tremendous fire, never wavered, but came straight at us.

The loss of No. 4 Column was 2 officers killed, 5 wounded, and 80 men killed and wounded. The strength of the enemy was thought to be about 20,000, of whom 1000 are supposed to have been killed. Colonel Wood’s operations at Hlobane were for the purpose of making demonstrations against the enemy, as directed by the General, who had reason to believe at that time, that he should find the whole Zulu army between his force and Eshowe. 

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief

No. 4 Column Colonel H.E. Wood
No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, RA 6 x 7 pounder guns
8 x Companies 90th (Perthshire Volunteers Light Infantry) Regiment of Foot
7 x Companies 1st/13th Regiment of Foot (1st Somersetshire) Prince Albert's Light Infantry
Mounted Infantry
Frontier Light Horse
Raaf's Transvaal Rangers
Baker's Horse
Kaffrarian Rifles
Weatherley's Border Horse
Natal Native Horse
Dutch Burghers
Wood's Irregulars

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Ntshingwayo kaMahole 
Somopho kaZikhala 
Mnyamana kaNgqengelele 
Prince Mbilini kaMswati 

inGobamakhosi
uVe
uDhloko
uDududu
isAngqu
iMbube
uThulwana
iNdluyengwe
inDlondlo
uNokhenke
uMbonambi
umCijo
abaQulusi

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The Battle of Isandlwana

The Battle of Isandlwana

The Battle of Isandlwana on 22nd January 1879 was the first major encounter in the Anglo Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom. The General ordered the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once to march. The Natal Native Pioneers, about 50 strong, accompanied the force, which marched out from the camp as soon as there was light enough to see the road. Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine, 1st/24th Regiment, was instructed to take command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn the force left with him consisting of 5 x companies 1st/24th and 1 x company 2nd/24th Regiment, 2 x guns Royal Artillery, about 20 x Mounted Infantry and Volunteers 30 x Natal Carbineers, 31 x Mounted Police, and 4 x companies Natal Native Contingent. An order was also despatched to Colonel Durnford at Rorkes Drift to move up to Isandhlwana. Lieutenant Colonel Pulleines instructions for the defence of the camp were, briefly, to draw in his line of defence and infantry outposts, but to keep his cavalry vedettes still far advanced. We may here note that the only country searched was that direct to the front and right front the direction of the wagon track although it is stated the Lieutenant General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our left front) on the 21st January 1879, and in this direction he had intended to make a reconnaissance. 

After the departure of the advance column nothing unusual occurred in camp until between seven and eight o’clock, when it was reported from the advanced picquet (on the lngqutu range of hills, about 1500 yards to the Major Clery. North) that a body of the enemy could be seen approaching from the north-east and various small bodies were afterwards seen. Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine got his men under arms, and sent a written message off to headquarters that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left front. This was received between 9.30 and 10 A.M. 

Colonel Durnford received the Generals order when on an expedition into Natal to obtain wagons, but at once returned to Rorkes Drift, and marched for Isandhlwana. Lieutenant Chard, Royal Engineers, who had ridden to camp for orders, met Colonel Durnford about a quarter of a mile from the camp at the head of his mounted men about 10.30 A.M., and told him the troops were in column outside the camp, and Zulus showing on the crest of the distant hills, several parties working round so far to the left that he was afraid they might be going to make a dash at the Drift. He took orders to Major Russell to hurry up with the rocket battery, to detach a company of Sikali men to protect the baggage, and for all to look out to the left.

Colonel Durnford reached the camp, and received all the information Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine could afford, finding the situation to be Lonsdales natives on outpost duty on the hills to the left, the guns in position on the left of the camp, and the infantry under arms. The oxen were driven into camp and Mr. Brickhill says tied to the yokes, but not inspanned. Constant reports were coming in from the hills to the left. The enemy are in force behind the hills. The enemy are in three columns. One column is moving to the left rear, and one towards the General. The enemy are retiring in every direction. The enemies force was given at 400 to 600. 

On hearing these reports, Colonel Durnford sent one troop Natal Native Horse to reinforce his baggage guard two troops to the hills to the left (under Captains G. Shepstone and Barton) one to move along the crest of the range, one to search the valley beyond and determined himself to go out to the front and prevent the one column joining the impi, which was supposed at that time to be engaged with the troops under the General he asked Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine for two companies of the 24th, to which Colonel Pulleine replied, that two companies could ill be spared, but that if Colonel Durnford ordered them, of course they should go. On consideration, Colonel Durnford decided only to take his own men, and moved out with his remaining two troops Natal Native Horse, followed by Major Russells rocket battery, with its escort of a company of Native Contingent, under Captain Nourse. 

A company 1st/24th, under Lieutenant Cavaye, was sent out as a picquet to the hills about 1200 yards north of the camp, and the remainder of the troops dismissed to their private parades, where the men were to lie down in readiness to turn out if required. At this time there was no expectation of an attack during the day, and no idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy. 

The two troops sent on the hills to the left to ascertain the enemy's movements, had proceeded about five miles from the camp, when the Zulu army came forward, advancing straight on towards the camp. Captain Shepstone ordered a retreat on the camp, and himself rode in with the warning that the whole Zulu army was advancing to attack it. Captain Shepstone met Captain Gardner on reaching the camp, and both officers then went to Colonel Pulleine, but, says Captain Gardner, the enemy were already on the hill on our left in large numbers. Colonel Durnford, having despatched his two troops to the left, had moved out to the front at a canter, followed at a foots pace by the rocket battery, etc. About five miles out, a trooper rode down from the hills on the left, and reported an immense impi behind the hills, and almost immediately the Zulus appeared in force in front and on the left, in skirmishing order, ten or twelve deep, with supports close behind. They opened fire at about 800 yards, and advanced very rapidly. Colonel Durnford retired a little way to a donga and extended his men, then fell back, keeping up a steady fire, for about two miles, when he came upon the remains of the rocket battery, which (it appeared) had turned to the left on hearing firing on the hills, been cut of, and broken up. Fighting was still going on here, but the Zulus were speedily driven back. 

Colonel Durnford retired slowly on the camp, disputing every yard of ground, until he reached a donga about 800 yards in front of the right of the camp there, prolonging the line of the camp troops, and the right being reinforced by between thirty and forty mounted men, under Captain Bradstreet, a stand was made.

This gully, Mr. Brickhill, interpreter to No. 3 Column, says, the mounted force held most tenaciously, every shot appearing to take effect and with the havoc caused by the guns, a thousand Zulu dead must have laid between the conical hill and the gully. They lay just like peppercorns upon the plain.

The two troops of native horse sent to reconnoitre the Ingqutu Hills, retired fighting before the enemy in good order to a crest in the neck which joins Isandlwana to Ingqutu. Leaving their horses well sheltered here, they held this crest splendidly, keeping up a steady galling fire. They were eventually compelled to retire, with the loss of Captain G. Shepstone.

We must now consider what had taken place at the camp. All was quiet till about twelve o’clock, when firing was heard on the hill where the company on picquet was stationed the troops were immediately turned out and formed on the left front of the camp. About this time Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, arrived with an order from the General, addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine, to send on the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain himself at his present camp and entrench it if Captain G. Shepstone reached the camp with his warning about the same time. Colonel Pulleine decided it was impossible to carry out the Generals order, as the enemy were already in great force on the hills to the left. Captain Gardner sent off a message to headquarters, saying that our left was attacked by about ten thousand of the enemy. A message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine. 

One company (Captain Mostyns) was moved up to support the picquet the enemy distant about 800 yards, moving towards our left. Orders to retire were received almost immediately, and the whole retired to the foot of the slope, the enemy rushing forward to the crest of the hill as our men disappeared. Captain Younghusbands company was at this time in echelon on the left.

The guns came into action about 400 yards on the left front of the camp, where they were able to throw shells into a large mass of the enemy that remained almost stationary about 3400 yards off. The three advanced companies of the 24th retired on the main body, when the situation was this. The two guns and the whole of the 24th in line, about 300 yards from the left front of the camp the natives took post on the right of the 24th; then came Durnfords Basutos and the extreme right was formed by about forty mounted Europeans the force holding the only position that afforded any shelter, broken ground and a donga in front of the camp the infantry in good position among the stones and boulders to the left and left centre of the camp, and who stood their ground most gallantly. The enemy approached to within about 400 yards, the two guns firing case. The heavy fire from the line told so upon the Zulus that they wavered and lay down they are said to have covered the valley in detached groups to the depth of about three quarters of a mile.

The enemy now began to work round the rear which they could do with impunity owing to the formation of the ground, and Captain Essex says I rode up to Lieutenant Colonel Durnford, who was near the right, and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check but at this moment, he says, those of the Native Contingent who had remained in action, rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the 24th, the enemy dashing forward in the most rapid manner. The ammunition of the mounted troops failing supplies had been repeatedly sent for, but none came, Colonel Durnford retired them towards the right of the camp whore the wagons and ammunition of the Native Horse were, and himself galloped off to the 24th, having previously told Captain Gardner that the position was too extended, and he desired to concentrate the force. Colonel Durnfords intention undoubtedly was to withdraw all the troops to the rising ground on the right of the camp, to which point he had retired his Native Horse. 

The Zulus rushed on the left in overwhelming numbers, completely surrounding the 24th. The guns limbered up, and made for the Rorkes Drift Road, but found it blocked by the enemy they therefore followed at crowd of natives and camp followers, who were running down a ravine the Zulus were all among them, stabbing men as they ran Down this ravine the fugitives hastened, the enemy round and among them, the assegai doing its deadly work. 

Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine was said by Lieutenant Coghill to have been killed, and during the flight Major Stuart Smith, Royal Artillery. (who had been wounded), Surgeon Major Shepherd, and many a man, mounted and on foot, were killed. The Buffalo was gained at a point about five miles below Rorkes Drift, and numbers of the fugitives were either shot, or carried away by the stream and drowned. Lieutenants Melville and Coghill rode from the camp, on its being carried by the Zulus, the former with the Queens colours of his regiment. These he bore into the river, but lost his horse, and was left struggling in the swift current; Lieutenant Coghill, who had safely crossed, rode in to his assistance, when his horse was shot. These brave young officers succeeded in gaining the Natal shore, but were soon overtaken by the enemy, and died Fighting to the last. The Natal Native Horse escaped with little loss they assisted many in the retreat, which they covered as well as they could, especially under Captain Barton on the banks of the Buffalo. Captain Essex puts the time of the retreat from the camp at about 1.30 P.M. 

After this period no one living escaped from Isandhlwana, and it was supposed that the troops had broken, and, falling into confusion, that all had perished after a brief struggle. Nothing was known of the after events of that fatal day for months, till, on the 21st May, the scene of the disaster was revisited, and the truth of the gallant stand made was established. 

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief 

No. 2 Column (detachment), Brev Col A.W. Durnford, RE, commanding
No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, RA 3 x 9 pounder rockets, Major F.B. Russell 
Natal Native Horse, Capt G. Barrington
No. 1 Troop Sikali's Horse Lt C. Raw
No. 2 Troop Sikali's Horse Lt J.A. Roberts
No. 3 Troop Sikali's Horse Lt R.W. Vause
Endendale Troop, Lt H.D. Davies
Hlubi's Troop, Lt A.F. Henderson
1st/1st Natal Native Contingent
D company Capt C. Nourse
E company Capt W.R. Stafford

No. 3 Column (detachment), Colonel H.B. Pulleine
N Battery, 5th Brigade RA 2 x 7 pounder guns, Major S. Smith
5th Field Company, Royal Engineers
A company 1st/24th Regiment of Foot, Lt C.W. Cavaye
C company 1st/24th Regiment of Foot, Capt R. Younghusband
E company 1st/24th Regiment of Foot, Lt F.P. Porteous
F company 1st/24th Regiment of Foot, Capt W.E. Mostyn
G company 2st/24th Regiment of Foot, Lt C.D.A. Pope
H company 1st/24th Regiment of Foot, Capt G.V. Wardell
No. 1 Squadron mounted Infantry 
Natal Mounted Police 
Natal Volunteers Corps, Major Dartnell
Natal Carabineers Lt F.J.D. Scott 
Newcastle Mounted Rifles Capt C.R. Bradstreet 
Buffalo Border Guard 
1st/3rd Natal Native Contingent
No. 6 company Capt R. Krohn
No. 9 company Capt J.F Lonsdale
2nd/3rd Natal Native Contingent
No. 4 company Capt E. Erskine
No. 5 company Capt A.J. Barry
Natal Native Pioneers Corps 
No. 1 company
Army Service Corps 90th Regiment of Foot
Army Hospital Corps 
Army Medical Department 

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Ntshingwayo kaMahole 
Mavumengwana kaNdlela 
Prince Dabulamanzi kaMapande

Left Horn Regiments
inGobamakhosi 
uMbonambi 
uVe

Chest Regiments
umKhulutshane 
umHlanga 
isAngqu
umCijo

Right Horn Regiments
uDududu
uNokhenke
iMbube

Loins at Isandlwana Reserve Regiments that were sent to Rorke’s Drift
uThulwana 
uDloko
inDluyengwe
inDlondlo

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The Battle of Inyezane

The Battle of Inyezane

On the 22nd January 1879 the column marched at 5 A.M., crossed the Inyezane River, and halted for breakfast, and to outspan the oxen for a couple of hours, in a fairly open spot, though the country round was a good deal covered with bush. The halt here was unavoidable, as there was no water for some distance beyond, but the country had been previously carefully scouted by the mounted troops under Major Barrow. 

At eight o'clock piquets were being placed, and the wagons parked, when a company of the Native Contingent who were scouting in front, under the direction of Captain Hart, staff officer attached to the regiment discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges, and making for the adjacent clumps of bush. The Zulus now opened a heavy fire upon this company, and almost immediately inflicted a loss upon it of 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 3 men killed. 

The Naval Brigade (with rockets), under Captain Campbell, the guns of the Royal Artillery, two companies of The Buffs, and the Native Pioneers were at once posted on a knoll close by the road, from when the whole of the Zulu advance was commanded. From this knoll the bush near was well searched with shell, rockets, and musketry. 

The wagons continuing to close up and park, two companies of The Buffs,who moved up with them, were ordered to clear the enemy out of the bush, guided by Captain Macgregor, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General. This they did in excellent style, driving the Zulus into the open, which again exposed them to a heavy fire from the knoll.

The engineers and mounted troops were now enabled to move up from the drift, and, supported by a half company of Buffs and a half company of the 99th, sent on by Lieutenant Colonel Welman (99th) from the rear of the column, cleared the Zulus out of the bush on the right flank, where they were seriously threatening the convoy. The Gatling gun also moved up from the rear, and came into action on the knoll. The enemy now endeavoured to outflank the left, and got possession of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, which assisted . their turning movement. This kraal was carried by Captain Campbell with his Naval Brigade, supported by a party of officers and non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent under Captain Hart, who were posted on high ground on the left of the road. Colonel Parnell with a company of Buff`s,and Captain Campbell with the Naval Brigade, now attacked some heights beyond the kraal, upon which a considerable body of the enemy was still posted. This action was completely successful, and the Zulus fled in all directions. About half past nine the last shot was fired, and the column was re-formed, and resumed its march at noon. 

The loss sustained in this action was 2 privates (The Buff's) killed, 2 officers, 4 non-commissioned officer, and 4 natives killed, and 1 officer and 15 men wounded. I Colonels Pearson and Parnell had their horses shot under them. 

The enemy's force was estimated at 4000 the umXhapho, uDlambedlu, iNgulube,inSukamngeni, iQwa, uDududu, iNdabakawomble and amaPhela Regiments, and some 650 men of the district and their loss upwards of 300 killed. The wounded appear to have been either carried away or hidden. Four miles beyond the scene of this engagement the column bivouacked for the night; and, moving off at 5 A.M. next day, reached Eshowe at 10 A.M. the rear guard not getting in till the afternoon. 

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief 

1st Division, No. 1 Column Colonel C.K. Pearson
No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, Royal Artillery 2 x 7 pounder guns and limbers
Naval Brigade Artillery, Royal Marines Light Infantry with 
2 x 7 pounder guns and limbers
1 x 24 pounder rocket tubes 
1 x Gatling gun and limber
No. 2 Company Royal Engineers
Naval Brigade's Contingent from HMS Active
6 x Companies 2nd/3rd East Kent (The Buffs) Regiment of Foot
No. 2 Squadron Mounted Infantry 
Natal Hussars
Stranger Mounted Rifles
Victoria Mounted Rifles
7 x Companies 1st/2nd Natal Native Contingent 
No. 2 Company, Natal Native Pioneer Corps 

2nd Division, No. 1 Column (detachment) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W.H.D.R. Welman
2 x Companies 2nd/3rd East Kent (The Buffs) Regiment of Foot
99th (Duke of Edinburgh's Lanarkshire) Regiment of Foot

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Godide kaNdlela
Matshiya kaMshandu
Masegwane kaSopigwasi
Mblilwane kaMhlanganiso
Phalane kaMdinwa

umXhapho
uDlambedlu
iNgulube
inSukamngeni
iQwa
uDududu
iNdabakawomble
amaPhela

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The Battle of Intombe

The Battle of Intombe

A sad disaster occurred on the Intombe River to a detachment of the 80th Regiment on the 12th March 1879. Captain Moriarty, with 104 men of the 80th, was escorting a convoy from Derby to Luneburg. On reaching the Intombe Drift (about four miles from Luneburg) the river was found to be rising, and by the time the advanced guard (thirty-five men, under Lieutenant Harward) had crossed, it was impossible to take the wagons over. They were therefore laagered on the river bank in the shape of a triangle; and there they remained next day. About 4 A.M. on the 12th March 1879 a shot was fired, and the troops turned out, remaining under arms for half an hour, when, all being quiet, they returned to their tents it transpired after wards that the outlying sentries had been surprised and killed by the enemy. Suddenly the fog lifted, and a large body of Zulus without any warning rushed on and took the laager, driving the troops into the river. The party under Lieutenant Harward, which was encamped on the opposite bank, opened a brisk fire, but were soon broken, and obliged to fly towards Luneburg; Lieutenant Harward, galloping in, gave the alarm. Only forty-four men of this detachment survived. 

Major Tucker sallied out from Luneburg, when the enemy slowly retreated. The wagons were saved, and the bodies of Captain Moriarty and his unfortunate men buried. 

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief

Captain D. Moriarty

No. 5 Column (detachment)
1 x Company 80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) Regiment of Foot

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Prince Mbilini kaMswati 

abaQulusi

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The Battle of Hlobane

The Battle of Hlobane

On March 28th, a reconnaissance by the whole cavalry force was made towards Hlobane. The Zulus were in possession of the mountain, which was ascended in skirmishing order as rapidly as possible, the enemy keeping up a heavy fire from caves and from behind huge rocks. The summit was reached with the loss of one officer Lieutenant Williams and serious fighting was kept up for some time in the endeavour to dislodge the Zulus from their secure positions. Captain the Hon. R. Campbell was killed, also Lieutenant von Sticenstron, and Colonel Wood himself had a very narrow escape. 

Whilst engaged in this struggle a Zulu army was moving up to seize the approaches to the mountain, and cut off the force from the camp. Immediately on this being. Observed a retreat was made in rapid but good order, until a very steep and stony krantz was reached, where the men could only move in single file here the enemy got in amongst the troopers, causing utter confusion. The officers did their best to steady their men, but it became a case of scmvc gui peut.

Captain Barton’s troop was sent down the mountain to recover the body of Lieutenant Williams, and returned, having been joined by Mr. Uys. On the Hats they came up with Colonel Weatherley’s troop, and found the enemy in front and on the right and left. Retreating a short distance they were surrounded so opening out they charged through the enemy and over the neck, which was lined with Zulus. But few were enabled to win their way through this perilous pass, and of those who did many were overtaken and killed on the plain. Of Captain Barton’s troop but eight men returned to camp that night. 

The broken force fought its way to the camp, followed by the enemy for several miles. Many a man’s life was saved by a comrade halting and taking him up on his own horse, a personal instance of which Captain D’Arcy gives. His horse had been killed under, him in the descent of the mountain, and he ran for his life for some 300 yards, when a man named Francis caught a horse for him, which, however, he shortly relinquished to a wounded comrade, running on himself on foot. Colonel Buller picked him up when nearly exhausted, but when he recovered his breath he dismounted; he was a second time in difficulties, and assisted by Lieutenant Blaine, and again, a third time, by Major Tremlett, Royal Artillery Indeed, most of the men got into camp with comrades mounted behind them. The loss was 12 officers and 84 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and also Colonel Wood’s staff officer, Captain the Hon. R. Campbell, Captain Barton, Coldstream Guards and Mr. Lloyd, Political Assistant. Colonel Wood’s horse was shot under him. 

Mr. Piet Uys, the leader of the Burgher force, was likewise amongst those killed in action this day. Small patrols were sent out next morning to endeavour to find any men who might have escaped. 

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief

No. 4 Column (detachment) Colonel H.E. Wood

Lieutenant Colonel R.H. Buller's Force
No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, RA (half a rocket battery)
Baker's Horse
Dutch Burghers
Frontier Light Horse
Raaf's Transvaal Rangers
Weatherley's Border Horse
2nd Battalion of Wood's Irregulars

Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Russell's Force
No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, RA (half a rocket battery)
Mounted Infantry
Kaffrarian Rifles
Natal Native Horse
1st Battalion of Wood's Irregulars
Prince Hamu kaNzibe

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Prince Mbilini kaMswati 

abaQulusi
umCijo 
inGobamakhosi
uVe 

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The Battle of Gingindlovu

The Battle of Gingindlovu

On 2nd April 1879, the column marched to Gingindlovu, and about a mile from the Inyczane River a laager was formed in a favourable position. From this point to Eshowe, the track, after crossing swampy ground, winds through a bushy and difficult country for about fifteen miles, the country covered with high grass, and thus affording easy cover. 

Eshowe could be plainly seen from the laager, and flash signalling was at once established. 

As this laager was destined to be the scene of an important engagement, we will describe the disposition of the troops Front face (north), 60th (The King's Royal Rifle Corps) Regiment of Foot right flank, 57th (West Middlesex) Regiment of Foot left flank, 99th (Duke of Edinburgh's Lanarkshire) Regiment of Foot and Buffs rear face, 91st (Princess Louise's Argyllshire Highlanders) Regiment of Foot, the angles manned by blue jackets and marines, and armed with the guns, Gatlings, and rocket tubes. The night passed without alarm, and the troops stood to arms at 4 A.M., the mounted men being sent out scouting as usual at earliest dawn. From scouts and piquets came reports, at 5.45 A.M., that the enemy was advancing, and at six the attack commenced on the north front. The Zulus advanced with great rapidity and courage, taking advantage of every bit of cover; they even pushed forward to within twenty or thirty yards of the entrenchments, but were checked by the steady fire of the 60th and the Gatling gun. Lieutenant Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles, received a dangerous wound, but cheered on his men to the end of the engagement. 

The attack, checked here, rolled round to the left face and, whilst this was being developed, a fresh force came up against the rear, probably anticipating that all the faces of the laager could not be defended at the same time. Here they obstinately held their ground, finding cover in the long grass and undulations. 

The mounted troops were now sent out, the mounted infantry and volunteers to clear the front face, and Captain Barrow to attack the enemy's right flank. On their appearance the Zulus commenced to retreat. It was now 7.30 A.M. and the Natal Native Contingent, clearing the ditch of the rear face, dashed out in pursuit, which, led by Captain Barrows horsemen, was carried on for several miles.

The loss of the enemy in this engagement is estimated at 1000, 671 bodies were actually counted. The attacking force is said to have numbered about 11,000 men. 

Colonel Pearson, who had watched the fight through a glass, telegraphed his congratulations to the General. The loss of the column was 2 officers and 9 men killed (including Lieutenant Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles), 5 officers and 57 men wounded. 

Orders of Battle

British Commander-in-chief

Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford Relief Column for Eshowe

1st Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel F.T.A. Law
Naval Brigade Artillery from HMS Shah and HMS Tenedos
2 x 9 pounder guns and limbers
2 x 24 pounder rocket tubes 
1 x Gatling gun and limber
Naval Brigade's contingents from HMS Shah and HMS Tenedos
91st (Princess Louise's Argyllshire Highlanders) Regiment of Foot
2 x Companies 2nd/3rd East Kent (The Buffs) Regiment of Foot
5 x Companies 99th (Duke of Edinburgh's Lanarkshire) Regiment of Foot
4th Battalion, Natal Native Contingent

2nd Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W.L. Pemberton
Naval Brigade Artillery from HMS Boadicea
2 x 24 pounder rocket tubes 
2 x Gatling gun and limber
Naval Brigade Contingent from HMS Boadicea, detachments of Royal Marines from HMS Boadicea and HMS Shah
57th (West Middlesex) Regiment of Foot
6 x Companies 3rd/60th (The King's Royal Rifle Corps) Regiment of Foot
5th Battalion, Natal Native Contingent 

Divisional Troops, under the command of Major P.H.S. Barrow
Jantzi Native Horse 
Mafunzi's Mounted Natives 
No. 1 Troop Natal horse 
Natal Volunteer Guides 
Native Foot Scouts 

Zulu Commander-in-chief

Somopho kaZikhala 
Phalane kaMdinwa
Mbilwane kaMahlanganisa
Masegwane kaSopigwasi
Sigcwelecwele KaMhlekehleke
Prince Dabulamanzi kaMapande
Mavumengwana

uVe
umHlanga
uMbonambi
umCijo
inGobamakhosi
uNokhenke
uThulwana

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